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Abstract: This research investigates the optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply 
chain. Using the setting of a two-echelon supply chain including a supplier and a retailer, we 
apply the game theory approach to derive the equilibriums for both a single pricing strategy and 
a two-stage pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibriums, we explore how the 
two pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions and supplier’s and retailer’s 
performance individually and collectively. The results of the analysis show that the optimal 
choice of pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost and its relationship with the two 
critical thresholds that are determined by a combination of factors including the potential 
market size, the price and quality sensitivity factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, 
and the quality deterioration rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Perishable foods, such as fresh produce, meat, seafood, bakery and cooked food, are basic 
necessities. A typical characteristic of perishable food is that its quality deteriorates 
continuously over time. At the same time, despite its critical role in the competition between 
grocery retailers, perishable food waste at grocery retailers due to damage, spoilage and other 
reasons is unacceptably high, estimated at approximately 15% (Wang and Li 2012). It is 
reported that in the world, 40-50% of all root crops, fruits, and vegetables are wasted 
(Gustavsson et al. 2011), representing not only a waste of production resources, but can also 
lead to hunger, poverty, income and economic growth decline (Wilem et al. 2014). In the United 
Kingdom (UK), supermarkets throw away at least 115,000 tons of food every year, the majority 
of which is perfectly good and eatable (the Telegraph 2016). According to the Food Rush (2016), 
40% of the food produced in the United States (U.S.) goes uneaten, which leads to £160 billion 
of food waste annually, and supermarkets contribute 10% of the wasted food. 
    Operating in an extremely competitive market environment, revenue management for 
perishable foods becomes particularly important for supermarkets. Among various marketing 
and management tools, pricing strategy plays a crucial role and is a challenging task for grocery 
retail managers. Inappropriate pricing has an adverse effect on the management of perishable 
food, which may result in huge amounts of waste and reduce business revenue. Many 
supermarkets, e.g., Tesco in the UK and Ito Yokado in Japan, mark down the retail prices of 
fresh produce when they are approaching their expiration dates. However, the price discount 
policy is not applied to all the perishable foods in these supermarkets. In contrast, a single 
pricing strategy is applied to fresh produce in other supermarkets such as Wal-Mart stores in 
Chengdu, China. Furthermore, there is also media criticism that grocery retailers have driven 
food waste to the upstream of the food supply chain. According to a new report published by 
Feedback (2018), UK supermarkets drive food overproduction and waste on farms estimated at 
2.5 million tons of food waste with an associated cost of £0.8 billion. Therefore, there are two 
natural questions that arise: 
(1) Which pricing strategy should be adopted by the grocery retailer? 
(2) How do different pricing strategies affect the performance of the retailer, the supplier 
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and the whole food supply chain?   
To investigate the above questions, we consider a two-echelon supply chain including an 
upstream supplier and a downstream retailer. The retailer orders perishable food from the 
supplier and then sells to the end users during the demand period. Game theoretical approach 
is used to model two pricing strategies: a single pricing strategy and a two-stage pricing strategy 
for the perishable food supply chain. We seek to understand the effect of pricing strategy on the 
perishable food supply chain’s decisions and performance by analyzing the equilibriums of the 
single pricing strategy and the two-stage pricing strategy.  
This research makes several contributions. First, this research complements existing 
studies (Wang and Li 2012; Herbon et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2016) on perishable food pricing 
strategies by extending the investigation on the optimal pricing strategy from the retail end to 
the whole food supply chain. Our research does not only examine the impact of two pricing 
strategies on the retailer’s pricing decisions and profits but also the supplier’s wholesale price 
decision and the performance of the whole food supply chain individually and collectively. 
Second, different from studies on dynamic pricing strategies (Liu et al. 2015; Adenso-Díaz et 
al. 2017; Li and Wang 2017), our analysis focuses on two pricing strategies that are commonly 
adopted by grocery retailers worldwide. Furthermore, we do not only derive the optimal retail 
prices but also the timing of price markdown for the two-stage pricing strategy. Finally, our 
research also provides some important managerial implications that are useful for food retailers 
and suppliers to make strategic and operational decisions to manage perishable foods effectively.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of relevant 
research. Next, both the single pricing model and the two-stage pricing model are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 examines the impact of pricing strategies on supply chain decisions and 
profits, and then explores the optimal choice of pricing strategy. Numerical analysis is presented 
to examine the effect of key parameters on decisions and performance in Section 5. Finally, we 
present concluding remarks highlighting key findings, managerial implications, and 
suggestions for future research in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature review  
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Numerous prior studies have been conducted on the perishable food supply chain from 
approaches such as quality (Aung and Chang 2014; He et al. 2018), planning models (Ahumada 
and Villalobos 2009; Soto-Silva et al. 2016) and sustainability (Beske et al. 2014; Li et al. 2014). 
In this section, we will review the more relevant literature to this study by focusing on two key 
streams: (1) the shelf life management of perishable foods and (2) the pricing strategy for 
perishable foods. 
    Due to continuous public scrutiny of agricultural food supply chain practices, there have 
been an increasing number of studies on perishable food supply chain management in recent 
years. Despite growing public and academic attention, Ahumada and Villalobos (2009) pointed 
out in their comprehensive review of application of the agriculture-food supply chain planning 
models that although shelf life features are critical in assuring the freshness and quality of 
perishable foods, there is a lack of research that incorporates shelf life features into perishable 
food supply chain planning models. The rapid technological development in the last two 
decades, particularly in information technologies such as global positioning systems, radio 
frequency identification (RFID) systems, and time-temperature indicators (TTI), has made a 
significant impact on perishable food supply chain management (Li et al. 2014; Soto-Silva et 
al. 2016). Blackburn and Scudder (2009) introduced the concept of the marginal cost of time, 
the rate at which the product loses value over time in the supply chain, in their model to analyze 
the supply chain strategy for perishable products. Rong et al. (2011) incorporated product 
quality in food supply chain modeling and integrated the important aspects of controlling 
temperature and managing product quality in the decision making in the fresh food supply chain 
management. In the context of a fresh produce supply chain, Yu and Nagurney (2013) 
considered food deterioration and discarding costs of spoiled products in a network-based 
competitive food supply chain model and evaluated alternative technologies associated with 
different supply chain activities. Aung and Chang (2014) found that in a cold chain, compared 
to the traditional visual assessment method, sensor-based real-time quality monitoring and 
assessment methods are superior in managing product quality. La Scalia et al. (2016) applied 
radio frequency sensors allocated inside the smart logistic unit to food supply chain 
management in order to ensure the product shelf life and achieve logistics efficiency and system 
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sustainability. Considering disruption risk and product deterioration, Huang et al. (2018a) 
investigated the optimal solutions for prices, preservation of investment and inventory in a 
three-level food supply chain setting. Zhu et al. (2018) provided a model-oriented review to 
understand the context-specific applications of operational research techniques in the 
sustainable food supply chain domain. However, the majority of this research stream 
concentrates on supply chain planning or inventory control for perishable food supply chains 
and less attention has been given to pricing strategy as an important tool to manage perishable 
foods. 
Firms’ technological investments in perishable products management in the food or other 
industry sectors is often combined with other operational decisions such as pricing or inventory 
control (Blackburn and Scudder 2009; Dolgui et al. 2008; He et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2018b; 
Navarro et al. 2018). Many inventory or supply chain models have been proposed in either 
deterministic (Wang et al. 2010; Cai et al. 2013; Qin et al. 2014; Li and Wang 2017) or stochastic 
(Modak et al. 2016; Tiwari et al. 2017; Roya et al. 2006; 2018) demand settings with the aim 
of total cost minimization or profit maximization through an optimal set of pricing, ordering 
quantity, and investment level. Another relevant research stream focuses on the pricing 
practices of perishable food products since pricing strategy has a significant impact on a firm’s 
revenue. Among them, dynamic pricing strategies have been explored extensively. Herbon et 
al. (2014) developed a dynamic pricing model for perishable product inventory management 
with the support of a TTI-based automatic detection device. Considering a price- and quality-
sensitive demand, Liu et al. (2015) incorporated quality degradation into a perishable food 
inventory model to simultaneously determine the dynamic pricing strategy and investment 
strategy. Li and Wang (2017) presented an application of a sensor data-enabled supply chain 
dynamic pricing model for perishable food. Although their research shows the potential benefits 
of big data-driven chilled food supply chain innovation, the implementation of dynamic pricing 
strategies is not straightforward for most grocery retailers (Wang and Li 2012; Lu et al. 2018). 
Adenso-Díaz et al. (2017) proposed a deterministic mathematical model to evaluate the impact 
of dynamic pricing strategies on revenues and spoilage. Their analysis found that on the one 
hand, a dynamic price strategy leads to food spoilage reduction, and on the other hand, it can 
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have a negative or positive impact on a firm’s total revenue depending on the speed of the price 
discounting strategy and the specific scenario. However, the cost of price adjustment was not 
considered in their study. This price adjustment cost accounts for a substantial portion of 
operational cost and can significantly influence firms’ decisions about dynamic pricing. 
Considering the price adjustment cost, Lu et al. (2018) proposed a suboptimal pricing strategy 
that includes both static pricing and dynamic pricing throughout the entire planning period. 
Nevertheless, the dynamic pricing model does not consider how consumer will react under this 
price strategy and some consumers may delay the time of their purchase, anticipating a lower 
price.   
    More relevant to the setting of this work, Wang and Li (2012) proposed a pricing approach 
based on dynamically identified food shelf life supported by tracking and tracing technologies. 
Although different pricing policies are explored following grocery retailers’ current practices, 
the analysis mainly focuses on how much a retailer should charge and discount but not the 
discount timing. Qin et al. (2014) proposed a joint pricing and inventory control model for 
perishable foods with an assumption that the quality and physical quantity of fresh produce 
deteriorate simultaneously over time. In their simulation study of the impact of price 
discounting frequency on a retailer’s performance, Chung and Li (2014) found that two-period 
and multiperiod pricing strategies deliver better performance than single-period pricing. Under 
the consumer price fairness perception, Wang et al. (2016) developed an optimal price 
markdown policy for perishable food considering the trade-offs between the food retailer’s 
revenue and the consumer’s utility. Nevertheless, most of the previously mentioned studies only 
consider pricing strategies from the retailer’s perspective. It is not clear how the pricing 
strategies adopted by the retailer affect suppliers’ decisions and the performance of the 
perishable food supply chain as a whole. This study fulfils this research gap by looking at two 
commonly adopted pricing practices and examining their impacts on operational decisions and 
the collective and individual performance for both the retailer and supplier with a consideration 
of continuous quality deterioration.  
 
3. The model and equilibrium analysis 
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3.1 The model 
We consider a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer, who orders 
perishable food from the supplier and then sells it to consumers. We assume the supply chain 
power structure is vertical Nash, that is, there is a balanced power relationship between the 
retailer and the supplier. This type of supply chain power relationship is common both in the 
supply chain management literature (Choi 1996; Chen et al. 2016; Luo et al. 2017) and in 
practice (Wilhelm 2016). The notation used in this paper is displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Notation 
𝑐 Unit product cost 
𝑤1 Unit wholesale price with retailer’s single pricing strategy 
𝑤2 Unit wholesale price with retailer’s two-stage pricing strategy 
𝑓(𝑡) Demand rate 
𝑝(𝑡) Unit retail price 
𝑝1 Unit retail price with single pricing strategy 
𝑝21 First-stage unit retail price with two-stage pricing strategy 
𝑝22 Second-stage unit retail price with two-stage pricing strategy 
𝑚1 Retailer’s marginal profit with single pricing strategy, 𝑝1 = 𝑤1 + 𝑚1 
𝑚21 Retailer’s first-stage marginal profit with two-stage pricing strategy, 𝑝21 = 𝑤2 + 𝑚21 
𝑚22 
Retailer’s second-stage marginal profit with two-stage pricing strategy, 𝑝22 = 𝑤2 +
𝑚22 
𝑇 Sale period 
𝑇1 Retailer’s markdown time with two-stage pricing strategy 
𝑀 Retailer’s markdown cost 
𝑀1 Retailer’s price markdown cost critical threshold 
𝑀2 Supply chain’s price markdown cost critical threshold 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1) Retailer’s profit with single pricing strategy 
𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1) Supplier’s profit with single pricing strategy 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1) Retailer’s profit with two-stage pricing strategy 
𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2) Supplier’s profit with two-stage pricing strategy 
𝛱1 Supply chain’s total profit with single pricing strategy 
𝛱2 Supply chain’s total profit with two-stage pricing strategy 
In alignment with prior studies (e.g., Tsiros and Heilman 2013; Wang and Li 2012), we 
use the following demand function: 
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𝑓(𝑡) = 𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑞(𝑡) 
The customer demand is influenced by retail price and product quality. 𝐷0 is the potential 
market size, 𝛼 is the price sensitivity factor, and 𝛽 represents the quality sensitivity factor. 
Among the existing perishable food management literature, food quality is often modeled as a 
decreasing parameter which depends on the time under the required preservation conditions 
(Blackburn and Scudder 2009; Wang and Li 2012; He et al. 2018). Here, 𝑞(𝑡) = 𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡 
indicates the quality level, which is determined by the initial quality (𝑞0) and the deterioration 
rate (𝜆). The sale period (𝑇) is determined by the demand rate, and the sale is finished when 
𝑓(𝑡) = 0. Instead of making quality a decision variable, we set retail and wholesale prices and 
timing of the pricing discount as the decision variables. 
3.2 Single-pricing model 
In the single-pricing model, 𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑝1 , that is, the unit retail price is constant during the 
demand period (0, 𝑇). The demand faced by the retailer in the single pricing model, denoted 
by  𝐷1 , is  𝐷1 = ∫ [𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝1 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)
𝑇
0
]𝑑𝑡 = (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝1 + 𝛽𝑞0)𝑇 −
1
2
𝛽𝜆𝑇2 . The 
decision problem faced by the retailer is to set the optimal retail price (𝑝1 ) to maximize his 
profit (𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1 )), and the decision problem faced by the supplier is to set the optimal wholesale 
price (𝑤1) to maximize his profit (𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)). 
The retailer’s profit with the single pricing strategy (𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1 )) is 
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1 ) = (𝑝1 − 𝑤1)[(𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝1 + 𝛽𝑞0)𝑇 −
1
2
𝛽𝜆𝑇2]                 (1) 
The first part of the formula is the unit profit margin for the retailer, and the second part is 
the demand faced by the retailer. 
Similarly, the supplier’s profit with the single pricing strategy (𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)) is 
𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1) = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)[(𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝1 + 𝛽𝑞0)𝑇 −
1
2
𝛽𝜆𝑇2]                  (2) 
The first part of the formula is the unit profit margin for the supplier, and the second part 
is the demand faced by the supplier 
The supply chain’s profit with the single pricing strategy (𝛱1) is 
𝛱1 = 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1 ) + 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)                              (3) 
As to the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝1
∗) and the supplier’s optimal wholesale price (𝑤1
∗) 
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with the single pricing strategy, we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: 𝒑𝟏
∗ =
𝒄𝜶+𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎
𝟐𝜶
 and 𝒘𝟏
∗ =
𝟑𝒄𝜶+𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎
𝟒𝜶
. 
This lemma means that the retailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝1
∗) and the supplier’s optimal 
wholesale price (𝑤1
∗) with the single pricing strategy exist and are unique. 
3.3 Two-stage pricing model 
In the two-stage pricing model, the retail price is a piecewise function as follows: 
𝑝2(𝑡) = {
    𝑝21     0 < 𝑡 < 𝑇1   
 𝑝22     𝑇1 < 𝑡 < 𝑇
                   
The demand faced by the retailer in the two-stage pricing model, denoted by  𝐷2, is 𝐷2 =
∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝21 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) ⅆ𝑡
𝑇1
0
+ ∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝22 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) ⅆ𝑡
𝑇
𝑇1
 . The retailer’s decision 
problem is to set the optimal retail prices (𝑝21, 𝑝22) and markdown time (𝑇1) to maximize his 
profit (𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1)), and the supplier’s decision problem is to set the optimal wholesale 
price (𝑤2) to maximize his profit (𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2)). 
The retailer’s profit with the two-stage pricing strategy (𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1)) is 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1) = 𝑝21 ∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝21 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡
𝑇1
0
 
+𝑝22 ∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝22 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡
𝑇
𝑇1
− 𝑤2 𝐷2 − 𝑀  (4) 
The first part of the formula is the revenue from the first stage sales, and the second part 
is the revenue from the second stage sales. The last two parts represent the wholesale cost and 
markdown cost, respectively. 
Similarly, the supplier’s profit with the two-stage pricing strategy (𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2)) is 
𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2) = (𝑤2 − 𝑐)[∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝21 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) ⅆ𝑡
𝑇1
0
 
 + ∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼𝑝22 + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) ⅆ𝑡
𝑇
𝑇1
]                     (5) 
The first part of the formula represents the supplier’s marginal profit, and the second part 
represents the market demand during the sale period. 
The supply chain’s profit with the two-stage pricing strategy (𝛱2) is 
𝛱1 = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1) + 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2)                       (6) 
As to the retailer’s optimal retail prices (𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ), markdown time (𝑇1
∗) and the supplier’s 
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optimal wholesale price (𝑤2
∗ ) with the two-stage pricing strategy, we obtain the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 2: 𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ =
𝟔𝒄𝜶+𝟕𝑫𝟎+𝟕𝜷𝒒𝟎
𝟏𝟑𝜶
   𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ =
𝟖𝒄𝜶+𝟓𝑫𝟎+𝟓𝜷𝒒𝟎
𝟏𝟑𝜶
   𝑻𝟏
∗ =
𝟒(𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎−𝒄𝜶)
𝟏𝟑𝜷𝝀
  and 𝒘𝟐
∗ =
𝟏𝟎𝒄𝜶+𝟑𝑫𝟎+𝟑𝜷𝒒𝟎
𝟏𝟑𝜶
. 
This lemma means that the retailer’s optimal retail prices (𝑝21
∗ , 𝑝22
∗ ), markdown time (𝑇1
∗) 
and the supplier’s optimal wholesale price (𝑤2
∗) with the two-stage pricing strategy exist and 
are unique. From lemma 2, we can also see that the quality deterioration rate (𝜆) does not have 
any impact on the optimal decisions of the initial retailer price, the markdown price and the 
wholesale price. However, the deterioration rate directly affects the optimal price markdown 
time (𝑇1
∗). A large rate, which means the quality of perishable food deteriorates rapidly, will 
cause the markdown time to come earlier during the sales period.    
 
4. Evaluate optimal pricing strategies for the perishable food supply chain 
In this section, we discuss the effects of retailers’ pricing strategies on the supply chain’s 
decisions and profits, and then evaluate the optimal pricing strategy. 
4.1 The effect of pricing strategy on decisions 
Regarding the effect of retailers’ pricing strategy on the supply chain’s pricing decisions, we 
derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: 𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ > 𝒑𝟏
∗ > 𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗  and 𝒘𝟏
∗ > 𝒘𝟐
∗ . 
This proposition indicates that with the two-stage pricing strategy, the retailer sets a higher 
retail price in the first stage than the optimal retail price with the single pricing strategy and 
then marks down the price in the second stage. Interestingly, the supplier sets a higher wholesale 
price with the single pricing strategy than that with the two-stage pricing strategy. Intuitively, 
the retailer will order more products with the two-stage pricing strategy than with the single 
pricing strategy, and the supplier then sets a lower wholesale price with the two-stage pricing 
strategy. 
4.2 The effect of pricing strategy on profits 
Regarding the effect of retailers’ pricing strategy on the optimal retailer profits, the supplier and 
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the supply chain, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 2:  
(1) If 𝟎 < 𝑴 < 𝑴𝟏   henn 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ ，𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ，𝑻𝟏
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
∗ );  if 𝑴 > 𝑴𝟏   henn 
𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ ，𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ，𝑻𝟏
∗ ) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
∗ ).  
(2) 𝝅𝒔𝟐(𝒘𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒔𝟏(𝒘𝟏
∗ ). 
(3) If 𝟎 < 𝑴 < 𝑴𝟐  henn 𝜫𝟐
∗ > 𝜫𝟏
∗ ; if 𝑴 > 𝑴𝟐  henn 𝜫𝟐
∗ < 𝜫𝟏
∗ .  
𝑴𝟏 =
𝟑𝟔𝟑(𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎−𝒄𝜶)
𝟑
𝟕𝟎𝟑𝟎𝟒𝜶𝜷𝝀
  𝑴𝟐 =
𝟐𝟑𝟓(𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎−𝒄𝜶)
𝟑
𝟑𝟓𝟏𝟓𝟐𝜶𝜷𝝀
. 𝑴𝟐 > 𝑴𝟏. 
From this proposition, we find that, for the retailer, whether the two-stage pricing strategy 
delivers superior financial performance compared to the single pricing strategy is determined 
by the price markdown cost (𝑀 ) and its relationship with a price markdown cost critical 
threshold (𝑀1 ). If the markdown cost is lower than the threshold (0 < 𝑀 < 𝑀1 ), then the 
retailer gains more profits with the two-stage pricing strategy than for the single pricing strategy. 
Otherwise, the single pricing strategy produces superior performance for the retailer. Intuitively, 
a high cost of price adjustment will have a negative impact on retailers’ revenues. This is the 
main reason that many retailers avoid more regular price adjustment despite the continuous 
quality degradation of perishable foods, which is in line with the findings of previous studies 
in the literature (Wang and Li 2012; Lu et al. 2018). Surprisingly, the critical threshold (𝑀1) is 
a decreasing function of 𝜆. This means that fast quality degradation will decrease the value of 
the critical threshold (𝑀1) . Nevertheless, apart from quality deterioration rate, this critical 
threshold is also influenced by many other factors including the potential market size (𝐷0), the 
price and quality sensitivities (𝛼 and 𝛽), the initial quality (𝑞0), and the unit product cost (c). 
In this case, the combination of these factors has a stronger influence on the retailer’s optimal 
pricing strategy than the quality deterioration rate.  
For the supplier, this proposition means that the supplier’s maximum profit with the two-
stage pricing strategy is always higher than with the single pricing strategy. This is due to the 
fact that the two-stage pricing strategy generates higher customer demand than the single 
pricing strategy because the second stage price set in the price markdown time period enables 
capture of the value loss of perishable foods in the demand period. Despite a lower wholesale 
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price as shown in Proposition 1, the supplier can gain more profit because of higher demand. 
As a result, the supplier has the incentive to motivate the retailer to adopt the two-stage pricing 
strategy.  
For the whole food supply chain, this proposition means that whether the whole supply 
chain will benefit from the two-stage pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost (𝑀) 
and its relationship with a price markdown cost critical threshold (𝑀2). If the markdown cost is 
lower than the critical threshold (0 < 𝑀 < 𝑀2), then the supply chain’s maximum profit with 
the two-stage pricing strategy is higher than with the single pricing strategy. Otherwise, the 
single pricing strategy generates more profit for the perishable food supply chain. Similar to 
𝑀1, 𝑀2 is a decreasing function of 𝜆 and is also influenced by many other factors including 
the potential market size (𝐷0), the price and quality sensitivities (𝛼 and 𝛽), the initial quality 
(𝑞0), and the unit product cost (c). Nevertheless, the value of 𝑀2 is higher than 𝑀1 (𝑀2 >
𝑀1), which means that, to gain benefit from the two-stage pricing strategy, the requirement of 
price markdown cost is less strict for the whole perishable supply chain than for the retailer.  
4.3 The choice of pricing strategy 
Based on the analysis of the effects of different pricing strategies on the profits of the retailer, 
the supplier and the whole supply chain, we can derive the following corollary on the choice of 
pricing strategy (shown in Figure 1). 
Corollary 1:  
(1) If 𝟎 < 𝑴 < 𝑴𝟏  henn 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ ，𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ，𝑻𝟏
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
∗ ) and 𝝅𝒔𝟐(𝒘𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒔𝟏(𝒘𝟏
∗ );  
(2) If 𝑴𝟏 < 𝑴 < 𝑴𝟐   henn 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ ，𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ，𝑻𝟏
∗ ) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
∗ )   𝝅𝒔𝟐(𝒘𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒔𝟏(𝒘𝟏
∗ ) 
and 𝜫𝟐
∗ > 𝜫𝟏
∗ ;  
(3) If 𝑴 > 𝑴𝟐   henn 𝝅𝒓𝟐(𝒑𝟐𝟏
∗ ，𝒑𝟐𝟐
∗ ，𝑻𝟏
∗ ) < 𝝅𝒓𝟏(𝒑𝟏
∗ )   𝝅𝒔𝟐(𝒘𝟐
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒔𝟏(𝒘𝟏
∗ )  and 
𝜫𝟐
∗ < 𝜫𝟏
∗ . 
 
Figure 1 Choice of pricing strategy 
𝑀
0 𝑀2
0 
𝑀1
0 
0 
II: Two-stage pricing strategy 
without Pareto improvement 
I: Two-stage pricing strategy 
with Pareto improvement 
III: Single pricing 
strategy 
13 
 
Corollary 1 means that the selection of optimal pricing strategy is decided by the 
markdown cost (M) and its relationship with two critical thresholds (𝑀1 and 𝑀2). Figure 1 
illustrates the three decision regions for the optimal pricing strategy: a two-stage pricing 
strategy with Pareto improvement (Region I), a two-stage pricing strategy without Pareto 
improvement (Region II), and a single pricing strategy (Region III). 
Region I: If the markdown cost is lower than the critical threshold, 𝑀1, (0 < 𝑀 < 𝑀1), 
then both the supplier and retailer gain more profits with the two-stage pricing strategy than 
with the single pricing strategy. Therefore, the two-stage pricing strategy benefits both the 
supplier and retailer. We call this scenario the two-stage pricing strategy with Pareto 
improvement. Under this condition, both the retailer and supplier should embrace the two-stage 
pricing stage to maximize their benefits. 
Region II: If the value of the markdown cost is in the interval between the two thresholds 
(𝑀1 < 𝑀 < 𝑀2 ), then the whole supply chain gains more profit with the two-stage pricing 
strategy than with the single pricing strategy, but the retailer gains less profit with the two-stage 
pricing strategy than with the single pricing strategy. We call this scenario the two-stage pricing 
strategy without Pareto improvement. From the retailer’s perspective, in order to benefit from 
such a scenario, they should explore possible ways to reduce the price adjustment cost or 
persuade the supplier to share some of the increased profit. From the supplier’s perspective, 
they should encourage the retailer to accept the two-stage pricing strategy through coordination 
mechanisms such as a profit-sharing contract to achieve a win-win situation for both supply 
chain parties. The optimal design for a profit-sharing contract will be explored in the next 
section.  
Region III: If the markdown cost is higher than the critical threshold, 𝑀2 (𝑀 > 𝑀2), then 
the retailer gains less profit with the two-stage pricing strategy than with the single pricing 
strategy and the same result applies to the whole perishable food supply chain. In this scenario, 
the price adjustment cost is too high for the perishable food supply chain to implement the two-
stage pricing strategy, and therefore the single pricing strategy is the optimal pricing strategy. 
4.4 Profit sharing contract design 
As shown in Figure 1, in the scenario of two-stage pricing strategy without Pareto improvement, 
14 
 
the two-stage pricing strategy hurts the retailer but benefits both the supplier and the supply 
chain. Then, the supplier has an incentive and the potential to induce the retailer to adopt the 
two-stage pricing strategy. In this case, a profit-sharing contract between the supplier and the 
retailer is explored. We assume that 𝜌 is the supplier’s profit-sharing ratio to the retailer, which 
measures the proportion that the retailer shares the supplier’s profit.  
Based on the above assumption, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 3: 𝝆 ∈ (𝝆, ?̅?). Wenrn 𝝆 =
𝟐𝟏𝟗𝟕𝑴𝜶𝜷𝝀
𝟕𝟐(𝑫𝟎+𝜷𝒒𝟎−𝒄𝜶)𝟑
−
𝟏𝟐𝟏
𝟕𝟔𝟖
 and ?̅? =
𝟏𝟎𝟕
𝟐𝟑𝟎𝟒
. 
This proposition means that a profit-sharing contract can coordinate the perishable food 
supply chain by redistributing the profits between the supplier and the retailer. When the 
supplier’s profit-sharing ratio (𝜌) is within the lower bound (𝜌) and the upper bound (?̅?), both 
the supplier and the retailer can gain more profits with the two-stage pricing strategy than with 
the single pricing strategy and achieve Pareto improvement. In this situation, the optimal design 
of a profit-sharing contract is therefore important to achieve a win-win situation for the supply 
chain. 
 
5. Numerical analysis and managerial implications 
In this section, we present numerical examples to analyze the effect of different parameters on 
the pricing strategy decisions, including initial quality (𝑞0), deterioration rate (𝜆) and relative 
elasticity (𝛾). Parameter values extracted from previous work (Wang et al. 2012; Li and Wang 
2017) are combined with the current grocery retailer practices as the inputs for the numerical 
analysis. 𝛥𝜋% , defined as 𝛥𝜋% =  
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21,𝑝22,𝑇1)−𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1)
 , is introduced to express the 
percentage of profit increase of the two-stage pricing strategy for the retailer. 𝛥𝜋% > 0 means 
the two-stage pricing strategy is better than the single pricing strategy for the retailer. In addition, 
we also examine the profit difference for the whole food supply chain. For unified parameter 
assignment, we set 𝐷0 = 9.79 and 𝑐 = 3.99£/unit. 
5.1 Effect of initial quality (𝒒𝟎) 
Initial quality affects pricing decisions by influencing the length of sales cycle and the total 
market demand. Set 𝛼 = 1.83, 𝛽 = 1.83, 𝜆 = 0.0067/ℎ. The effects of 𝑞0 on the two-price 
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markdown cost critical thresholds (𝑀1 and 𝑀2) for the retailer and the whole supply chain are 
shown in Figure 2, which leads to three decision regions. Region I means that the two-stage 
price strategy leads to Pareto improvement, which increases the profit margin of both the retailer 
and the supplier. Region II describes the situation in which there is an increase in total profit 
for the whole supply chain but not the retailer. Region III refers to the situation where the single 
pricing strategy delivers better performance for the whole food supply chain.      
 
Figure 2 Effect of initial quality (𝒒𝟎) 
The result in Figure 2 shows that an increase of 𝑞0 will increase the two critical thresholds 
(𝑀1 and 𝑀2), whose relationship with the price markdown cost determines whether the two-
stage pricing strategy should be adopted. It is evident that the value of perishable foods, which 
is reflected in the initial quality (𝑞0), has a positive impact on the benefit gained from the two-
stage pricing strategy. As seen, the thresholds of price markdown cost for the two-stage pricing 
strategy are lower with a high initial quality value. In such a case, it is more likely for the retailer 
and the whole supply chain to benefit from the two-stage pricing strategy. Therefore, the initial 
quality level is an important factor that should be taken into consideration when choosing 
pricing strategies. 
5.2 Effect of deterioration rate (𝛌) 
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The speed of food quality deterioration is often an important factor influencing grocery retailers’ 
pricing decisions (Blackburn and Scudder 2009; Wang and Li 2012). Now, we set 𝑞0 =
0.95 , 𝛼 = 1.83 , 𝛽 = 1.83 , and examine the effects of 𝜆 on the two critical thresholds 𝑀1 
and 𝑀2. The result is shown in Figure 3 and again, the optimal pricing decisions are classified 
into three decision regions by the two critical thresholds. Interestingly, an increase in the quality 
deterioration rate reduces the value of the two critical thresholds (𝑀1 and 𝑀2), which means 
that it is more likely for the retailer and the whole food supply chain to benefit from the single 
pricing strategy with a high deterioration rate 𝜆. This finding is different from some industrial 
practices that discount price or regularly mark down the price of perishable foods with fast 
quality degradation such as meat and vegetable products. This can be explained by consumer 
delay in purchasing, waiting for a reduced price. In fact, it is more appropriate to implement the 
single pricing strategy for food products with short shelf-lives. 
     
Figure 3 Effect of deterioration rate (λ) 
5.3 Effect of relative elasticity (𝜸) 
Relative elasticity reflects the relative impact of price and quality on demand of perishable 
goods. Here, we introduce the demand elasticity ratio 𝛾, defined as 𝛾 =
𝛼
𝛽
, to investigate how 
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the relative elasticity affects pricing decisions. Here, 𝛾 > 1 means the influence of the price 
sensitivity factor (𝛼 ) is stronger than the quality sensitivity factor (𝛽 ). Let 𝛼 = 1.83 , 𝑞0 =
0.95 ,  𝜆 = 0.0067/ℎ . We simulate different values of 𝛾  by changing 𝛽 . Similar to the 
previous analysis, the effects of 𝛾 on the two critical thresholds (𝑀1 and 𝑀2) are shown in 
Figure 4. When the elasticity ratio is low (a relatively low value of 𝛼 or a relatively high value 
of 𝛽 ), both critical thresholds are high. Therefore, it does not require a low cost of price 
markdown to benefit from the two-stage pricing strategy. In this case, it is more likely for the 
retailer and the whole supply chain to benefit from the two-stage pricing strategy. In contrast, 
the two thresholds decease when the elasticity ratio (𝛾) increases. The degree of decrease in the 
two thresholds slows when the elasticity ratio reaches a certain level (e.g., 𝛾 > 1), indicating 
that it is more likely for the retailer and the whole food supply chain to benefit from the single 
pricing strategy if customer demand is more sensitive to price than quality. What is intuitive is 
clear: there is no need to mark down food price if consumer demand is not sensitive to food 
quality deterioration.  
 
Figure 4 Effect of relative elasticity 𝜸 
5.4 Managerial implications 
The insights generated through modeling and numerical analysis provide some important 
managerial implications to retailers and suppliers in the food supply chain. For instance, the 
result of our analysis demonstrates that it should not be compulsory to apply the two-stage 
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pricing strategy (i.e., price markdowns) to perishable food products with short shelf lives (i.e., 
a high quality deterioration rate). In fact, whether grocery retailers should implement the two-
stage pricing strategy depends on the price adjustment cost and its relationship to the critical 
thresholds identified in this research. Nevertheless, these two critical thresholds are also 
influenced by other model parameters such as initial quality level, quality deterioration rate and 
demand elasticity. Instead of marking down the prices of food products that are approaching 
their shelf lives, these important factors have to be considered before the implementation of any 
pricing strategies. Furthermore, for the product types for which the two-stage pricing strategy 
is more likely to deliver better financial performance for the food retailer and the food supply 
chain, food organizations should also explore ways to reduce price adjustment cost to pursue a 
more regular price discounting strategy for perishable foods. Finally, we also observed that in 
the situation in which the multistage pricing strategy benefits the whole supply chain but 
decreases the retailer’s profit, food suppliers should take supply chain coordination mechanisms 
initiatives to encourage food retailers to adopt the multiple-stage pricing strategy. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper investigates the optimal pricing strategy for perishable foods from the perspective 
of a two-echelon supply chain composed of a suppler and a retailer. Using the game theory 
approach, we derive the equilibrium points for the single pricing strategy and the two-stage 
pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibrium points, we analyzed how the two 
pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions as well as the supply chain members’ 
individual and collective performances. Our analysis generates some novel insights. For 
instance: 
• Whether the retailer benefits from the two-stage pricing strategy depends on the price 
markdown cost and its relationship with the critical threshold (𝑀1) that is determined by a 
combination of factors including the potential market size, the price and quality sensitivity 
factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, and the quality deterioration rate. A similar 
rule applies to the whole supply chain although the critical threshold 𝑀2 is higher than 𝑀1. 
Interestingly, the supplier is always better off with the two-stage pricing strategy.  
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• Compared to the single pricing strategy, the advantage of the two-stage pricing strategy is 
mainly contributed by an induced customer demand as such a pricing strategy captures the 
quality deterioration of perishable food and sets a markdown price reflecting its quality 
degradation. It is the trade-off between the increased demand and incurred cost (i.e., price 
markdown cost) that determines whether the retailer and the whole supply chain will benefit 
from the two-stage pricing strategies. In principle, this trade-off is governed by the price 
markdown cost (M) and its relationship with the two critical thresholds (𝑀1 and 𝑀2).  
• This research provides some important managerial implications for food organizations. For 
instance, our analysis clearly specifies the conditions under which food retailers should 
adopt different pricing strategies. When the two-pricing strategy is the more favorable 
strategy, we do not only derive the optimal price but also the price markdown timing, which 
is useful for retailers to implement the pricing strategy. Finally, we also find that in the 
situation in which the retailer is worse off but the supply chain is better off, the perishable 
food supply chain can be coordinated through a profit-sharing contract to achieve a win-
win outcome.  
    Like other studies using a modeling approach, this research has several limitations. First, 
for simplification, the quality deterioration rate was assumed to be linear with time. In fact, the 
quality deterioration rate of perishable food varies among different product categories (Rong et 
al. 2011; Wang and Li 2012). A future extension is to explore different forms (i.e., exponential) 
of quality degradation in the modeling. In addition, our model only discusses a supply chain 
setting consisting of one retailer and one supplier using linear deterministic demand. An 
important extension is to consider stochastic demand (Chen and Wang 2016; He et al. 2018) 
and investigate multiple retailers and suppliers. Finally, the pricing strategies for the perishable 
food supply chain were modeled in the setting of a balanced power relationship between the 
retailer and suppliers. A future extension is to explore how different power relationships affect 
the pricing decisions and performance of the perishable food supply chain (Shi et al. 2013; Chen 
and Wang 2015; Chen et al. 2017).  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: Set 𝑝1 = 𝑚1 + 𝑤1 . From (1), we obtain  𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1 ) =  𝜋𝑟1(𝑚1 ) = (𝑚1)[(𝐷0 −
𝛼(𝑚1 + 𝑤1) + 𝛽𝑞0)𝑇 −
1
2
𝛽𝜆𝑇2] , then 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑚1 )
𝑑𝑚1
= −
1
2
𝑇(𝑇𝛽𝜆 − 2𝐷0 + 4𝛼𝑚1 − 2𝛽𝑞0 + 2𝛼𝑤1)  and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑟1(𝑚1 )
𝑑𝑚1
2 = −2𝛼𝑇 < 0, so 𝜋𝑟1(𝑚1 ) is a concave function of 𝑚1 . From (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1) =
(𝑤1 − 𝑐) [𝐷0𝑇 − 𝛼(𝑚1 + 𝑤1)𝑇 + 𝑇𝛽𝑞0 −
1
2
𝑇2𝛽𝜆] , then 
𝑑𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
= 𝐷0𝑇 − 𝛼(𝑚1 + 𝑤1)𝑇 + 𝑇𝛽𝑞0 −
1
2
𝑇2𝛽𝜆 − (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝛼𝑇  and 
𝑑2𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤12
= −2𝛼𝑇 < 0 , so 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)  is a concave function of 𝑤1 . Let 
𝑑𝜋𝑟1(𝑚1 )
𝑑𝑚1
=
𝑑𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
= 0, we obtain 𝑚1 = −
2𝑐𝛼+𝑇𝛽𝜆−2𝐷0−2𝛽𝑞0
6𝛼
 and 𝑤1 =
4𝑐𝛼−𝑇𝛽𝜆+2𝐷0+2𝛽𝑞0
6𝛼
. Replace 
𝑇 =
𝐷0−𝛼𝑝1+𝛽𝑞0
𝛽𝜆
  to 𝑚1  and 𝑤1 , then we obtain 𝑚1
∗ =
−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0
4𝛼
 , 𝑤1
∗ =
3𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0
4𝛼
  and 𝑝1
∗ =
𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0
2𝛼
. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: From 𝐷2 we obtain 𝑇 =
𝐷0−𝛼𝑝22+𝛽𝑞0
𝛽𝜆
. Set 𝑝21 = 𝑚21 + 𝑤2 and 𝑝22 = 𝑚22 +
𝑤2 . From (4), we obtain 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21, 𝑝22, 𝑇1) = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21, 𝑚22, 𝑇1) = (𝑚21 + 𝑤2) ∫ [𝐷0 − 𝛼(𝑚21 +
𝑇1
0
𝑤2) + 𝛽(−𝑡𝜆 + 𝑞0)] 𝑑𝑡 + (𝑚22 + 𝑤2) ∫ [𝐷0 − 𝛼(𝑚22 + 𝑤2) + 𝛽(−𝑡𝜆 + 𝑞0)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑇
𝑇1
) − 𝑤2𝐷2 − 𝑀  , 
then 
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑚21
= −
1
2
𝑇1(−2𝐷0 + 4𝛼𝑚21 − 2𝛽𝑞0 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇1 + 2𝛼𝑤2) , 
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑚22
= −
1
2
(𝑇 −
𝑇1)(𝑇𝛽𝜆 − 2𝐷0 + 4𝛼𝑚22 − 2𝛽𝑞0 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇1 + 2𝛼𝑤2) ,  
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑇1
= −(𝑚21 − 𝑚22)(−𝐷0 +
𝛼𝑚21 + 𝛼𝑚22 − 𝛽𝑞0 + 𝛽𝜆𝑇1 + 𝛼𝑤2)  then from (5), we obtain 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2) = (𝑤2 − 𝑐)[∫ (𝐷0 −
𝑇1
0
𝛼(𝑚21 + 𝑤2) + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡 + ∫ (𝐷0 − 𝛼(𝑚22 + 𝑤2) + 𝛽(𝑞0 − 𝜆𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡
𝑇
𝑇1
]，then 
𝑑𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
= 𝑇𝑐𝛼 −
1
2
𝑇2𝛽𝜆 + 𝑇𝐷0 + 𝑇𝛽𝑞0 − 𝛼𝑚21𝑇1 + 𝛼𝑚22(−𝑇 + 𝑇1) − 2𝑇𝛼𝑤2  and 
𝑑𝜋𝑠2
2(𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤22
= −2𝛼𝑇 < 0 , that is, 
𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2) is a concave function of 𝑤2 . From 
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑚21
=
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑚22
=
∂𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
∂𝑇1
=
𝑑𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2)
𝑑𝑤2
= 0  and 𝑇 =
𝐷0−𝛼𝑝22+𝛽𝑞0
𝛽𝜆
 , then we obtain 𝑚21
∗ =
4(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛼
  𝑚22
∗ =
2(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛼
 , 
𝑝21
∗ =
6𝑐𝛼+7𝐷0+7𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
 , 𝑝22
∗ =
8𝑐𝛼+5𝐷0+5𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
 , 𝑇1
∗ =
4(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛽𝜆
 , 𝑤2
∗ =
10𝑐𝛼+3𝐷0+3𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
 . Since 𝐻1 =
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚212
 , 𝐻1|𝑚21=𝑚21∗ ,𝑚22=𝑚22∗ ,𝑇1=𝑇1∗,𝑤2=𝑤2∗ = −
8𝛼(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛽𝜆
< 0 , 𝐻2 =
26 
 
|
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚21
2
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚22𝜕𝑚21
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚21𝜕𝑚22
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚22
2
| , 𝐻2|𝑚21=𝑚21∗ ,𝑚22=𝑚22∗ ,𝑇1=𝑇1∗,𝑤2=𝑤2∗ =
64𝛼2(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
2
169𝛽2𝜆2
> 0 , 𝐻3 =
|
|
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚212
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚21𝜕𝑚22
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚21𝜕𝑇1
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚22𝜕𝑚21
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚222
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑚22𝜕𝑇1
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑇1𝜕𝑚21
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑇1𝜕𝑚22
𝜕𝜋2𝑟
2(𝑚21,𝑚22,𝑇1)
𝜕𝑇1
2
|
|
 , 𝐻3|𝑚21=𝑚21∗ ,𝑚22=𝑚22∗ ,𝑇1=𝑇1∗,𝑤2=𝑤2∗ =
−
64𝛼(𝐷0−𝑐𝛼+𝛽𝑞0)
3
2197𝛽𝜆
< 0. Then,𝑚21
∗ , 𝑚22
∗ , 𝑇1
∗ is the maximum point of 𝜋𝑟2(𝑚21, 𝑚22, 𝑇1). So, 𝑚21
∗ =
4(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛼
 𝑚22
∗ =
2(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
13𝛼
 𝑝21
∗ =
6𝑐𝛼+7𝐷0+7𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
 , 𝑝22
∗ =
8𝑐𝛼+5𝐷0+5𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
 , 𝑇1 =
4(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
13𝛽𝜆
 , 
𝑤2
∗ =
10𝑐𝛼+3𝐷0+3𝛽𝑞0
13𝛼
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: From lemma 1 and lemma 2, we obtain 𝑝21
∗ − 𝑝1
∗ =
𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼
26𝛼
> 0 and 𝑝1
∗ −
𝑝22
∗ =
3(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
26𝛼
> 0, then 𝑝21
∗ > 𝑝1
∗ > 𝑝22
∗ . Similarly, from lemma 1 and lemma 2, we obtain 𝑤1
∗ −
𝑤2
∗ =
𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼
52𝛼
> 0, that is, 𝑤1
∗ > 𝑤2
∗. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: (1) From lemma 1 and equation (1), we obtain 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗) =
(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
3
32𝛼𝛽𝜆
 . 
Similarly, from lemma 2 and equation (4), we obtain 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) =
1
2197𝛼𝛽𝜆
(−80𝑐3𝛼3 −
2197𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆 + 80𝐷0
3 + 240𝑐2𝛼2𝛽𝑞0 − 240𝑐𝛼𝛽
2𝑞0
2 + 80𝛽3𝑞0
3 − 240𝐷0
2(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0) + 240𝐷0(𝑐𝛼 −
𝛽𝑞0)
2) . Then, 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) − 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗) =
1
70304𝛼𝛽𝜆
[−363𝑐3𝛼3 − 70304𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆 + 363𝐷0
3 +
1089𝑐2𝛼2𝛽𝑞0 − 1089𝑐𝛼𝛽
2𝑞0
2 + 363𝛽3𝑞0
3 − 1089𝐷0
2(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0) + 1089𝐷0(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0)
2] . Let 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) − 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗) = 0 , we obtain 𝑀1 =
363(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
3
70304𝛼𝛽𝜆
 . So, if 0 < 𝑀 < 𝑀1 , then 
𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) > 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗); if 𝑀 > 𝑀1, then 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) < 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗). 
(2) From lemma 1 and equation (2), we obtain 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1
∗) =
(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
3
32𝛼𝛽𝜆
. Similarly, from lemma 
2 and equation (5), we obtain 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) =
72(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
3
2197𝛼𝛽𝜆
 . Then, 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) − 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1
∗) =
107(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
3
70304𝛼𝛽𝜆
> 0, that is, 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) > 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1
∗). 
(3) From lemma 1, equation (1) and equation (2), we obtain 𝛱1
∗ = 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗) + 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1
∗) =
27 
 
(−𝑐𝛼+𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0)
3
16𝛼𝛽𝜆
. Similarly, from lemma 2, equation (4) and equation (5), we obtain  𝛱2
∗ = 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，
𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) + 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) =
1
2197𝛼𝛽𝜆
(−152𝑐3𝛼3 − 2197𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆 + 152𝐷0
3 + 456𝑐2𝛼2𝛽𝑞0 −
456𝑐𝛼𝛽2𝑞0
2 + 152𝛽3𝑞0
3 − 456𝐷0
2(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0) + 456𝐷0(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0)
2) . Then,  𝛱2
∗ − 𝛱1
∗ =
1
35152𝛼𝛽𝜆
(−235𝑐3𝛼3 − 35152𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆 + 235𝐷0
3 + 705𝑐2𝛼2𝛽𝑞0 − 705𝑐𝛼𝛽
2𝑞0
2 + 235𝛽3𝑞0
3 −
705𝐷0
2(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0) + 705𝐷0(𝑐𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞0)
2). Let 𝛱2
∗ − 𝛱1
∗ = 0, we obtain 𝑀2 =
235(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
3
35152𝛼𝛽𝜆
. So, if 
0 < 𝑀 < 𝑀2 , then 𝛱2
∗ > 𝛱1
∗ ; if 𝑀 > 𝑀2 , then 𝛱2
∗ < 𝛱1
∗ . 𝑀2 − 𝑀1 =
107(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)
3
70304𝛼𝛽𝜆
> 0 , that is, 
𝑀2 > 𝑀1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: To achieve both the supplier and the retailer Pareto improvement, 𝜌 should 
satisfy 𝜋𝑟2(𝑝21
∗ ，𝑝22
∗ ，𝑇1
∗) + 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) × 𝜌 > 𝜋𝑟1(𝑝1
∗)  and 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) − 𝜋𝑠2(𝑤2
∗) × 𝜌 > 𝜋𝑠1(𝑤1
∗) . 
Recalling lemma 1, lemma 2, equation (1), equation (2), equation (4) and equation (5), we obtain 
2197𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆
72(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)3
−
121
768
< 𝜌 <
107
2304
. Set 𝜌 =
2197𝑀𝛼𝛽𝜆
72(𝐷0+𝛽𝑞0−𝑐𝛼)3
−
121
768
 and ?̅? =
107
2304
, we get 𝜌 ∈ (𝜌, ?̅?). 
